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Case No. 20090546-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
State of Utah,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.

Benson Manwaring,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a conviction for driving under the influence of
alcohol. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-103(2)(j)
(West 2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
la. Did Defendant voluntarily consent to take a portable breath test (PBT),
where the trial court's uncontested factual findings not only show that Defendant
affirmatively responded to a request from an officer, but also that the officer's
request was unaccompanied by any show of force, threat, or act of coercion?
lb. Was the officer entitled to consider the results of the PBT as part of his
probable cause determination, where no Utah authority prohibited such use?

Standard of Review: When reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to
suppress, this Court reviews the court's factual findings for clear error and its legal
conclusions for correctness. State v. Dunkel, 2006 UT App 339, ^ 6,143 P.3d 290.
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it excluded expert testimony
on an irrelevant issue?
Standard of Review: A trial court's decision to exclude expert testimony is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Holm, 2006 UT 31, U10,137 P.3d 726.
Similarly, A trial court has "broad discretion to determine whether proffered
evidence is relevant, and we will find error in a relevancy ruling only if the trial
court has abused its discretion."

State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, f 17, 999 P.2d 7

(quotations and citation omitted).
3. Did the trial court correctly reject Defendant's vagueness challenge to the
DUI statute, where uncontested evidence shows that Defendant engaged in conduct
that was clearly prohibited by the statute?
Standard of Review: When reviewing the constitutionality of a statute, this
Court "presume[s] that the statute is constitutional. The challenger bears the burden
of demonstrating the unconstitutionality of a statute." State v. Johnson, 2009 UT App
382, ^f 18, — P.3d —. "Furthermore, unconstitutionality of a statute must be shown

2

beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellate courts review constitutional challenges for
correctness/' Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Annotated § 41-6a~502 (Supp. 2009)1
(1) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle within
this state if the person:
(a) has sufficient alcohol in the person's body that a subsequent
chemical test shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol
concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of the test;
(b) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person
incapable of safely operating a vehicle; or
(c) has a blood alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time
of operation or actual physical control.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On June 26, 2005, Defendant was charged with one count of DUI. R. 1-2.
Defendant subsequently filed a motion to suppress the results of the field sobriety
test and the blood alcohol tests that had been taken at the time of his arrest. R. 30-

Shortly after this incident, an amended version of the statute took effect
which removed an additional variant of DUI that had been set forth in Utah Code
Annotated § 41-6a-502(d). That amendment did not alter the provisions at issue
here. Except where necessary, the State cites to the current version of the statute.
3

38. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Defendant's motion. R.
69, 97-114; 456:1404.
Defendant provided notice prior to trial that he intended to call an expert to
testify regarding blood alcohol absorption rates. R. 134. The trial court initially
approved the expert, R. 201, but subsequently reconsidered and concluded that the
proposed testimony would be irrelevant to the variant of DUI at issue here. R. R.
457: 98-99.
Defendant was tried on September 29, 2008. R. 281-82. Following
deliberations, the jury convicted Defendant. R. 356-58.
STATEMENT OF FACTS*
On June 19, 2005, Defendant was on his motorcycle with his fiancee,
preparing to turn left at a light, when an oncoming car veered out of its lane and
struck him. R. 456: 6. The accident occurred at approximately 9:25 pm. R. 458:16.
2

In his brief, Defendant relies on his testimony from the suppression hearing
about the alcohol testing at issue. Aplt. Br. 3-4,19. At the conclusion of that hearing,
however, the trial court concluded that Defendant's account was not reliable, and
instead "adopt[ed] the officers' version of the facts." R. 106.
This Court ordinarily "'recite[s] the facts in a light most favorable to the trial
court's findings.'" State v. Bunting, 2002 UT App 195, f 2, 51 P.3d 37 (citation
omitted). This is particularly the case where, as here, the defendant fails to directly
challenge those findings in his brief. State v. Despain, 2003 UT App 266, TJ10 n.4, 74
P.3d 1176. As such, the State relies on the findings "as drafted by the [trial] court."
Id. For convenience, the trial court's ruling is attached as Addendum A to this brief.
4

Officer Kreston Bascom arrived on scene a short time later to investigate the
accident. R. 458: 18. As part of his investigation, Officer Bascom spoke with
Defendant, who was in an ambulance being treated for his injuries. R. 113; 456: 34.
Officer Bascom "smelled alcohol on the defendant's breath" and suspected that
Defendant might have been driving while intoxicated. R. 112. Officer Bascom
radioed dispatch and requested two backups: one to assist with traffic control, and
one to investigate Defendant for DUI. R. 458: 34.
Officer Joshua Jennings subsequently arrived on the scene to "conduct the
DUI portion of the investigation/' R. I l l ; 456: 61. Officer Bascom told Officer
Jennings that he had smelled alcohol on Defendant's breath and "suspected a DUI/7
R. 112. Officer Jennings then spoke with Defendant in the ambulance. R. 112.
Defendant told him that he thought that his ankle was broken, and Officer Jennings
"observed cuts and scrapes all over the defendant's legs and road rash on his
hands." R. 111-12. But Defendant "affirmatively asserted that he did not have any
head injuries," and "Officer Jennings testified that the paramedics did not believe
that the defendant had sustained any head injury and did not see any signs of a
head injury." R. 111-12. Defendant also did not appear to be in shock. R. 458: 67.
While speaking with Defendant, Officer Jennings "noted a strong odor of
alcohol emanating from" Defendant's breath. R. I l l ; 455: 6; 456: 62. At the
5

conclusion of their conversation, Officer Jennings left the ambulance and examined
the scene of the accident. R. 111. He saw Defendant's motorcycle on the ground
with damage to its front tire.

R. 111. "He further observed three 24-ounce

unopened cans of beer on the ground close to the motorcycle." R. 111.
Officer Jennings did not have a portable breath test (PBT) or DUI citation
form with him, so he did not request that Defendant take the PBT or perform any
field sobriety tests at that time. R. 110-11; 456: 63-64. Instead, while the ambulance
transported Defendant to the hospital, Officer Jennings drove to the police station,
retrieved the necessary items, and met Defendant in the emergency room. R. 110-11;
456: 63-64.
Officer Jennings arrived at the hospital at 10:35 pm and then asked Defendant
"if he would perform some sobriety tests." R. 108,110. Defendant "indicated that
he would perform the tests." R. 110. Due to Defendant's leg and ankle injuries,
Officer Jennings did not have him perform the walk-and-turn test or the one-legstand test. R. 110. Instead, Officer Jennings only had him perform the horizontalgaze nystagmus test (HGN). R. 110.
Officer Jennings later testified regarding the nature of the HGN. He explained
that when a person is impaired, the alcohol "slows down their physical reaction to
track an object" with their eyes. R. 458: 39. As a result, an observer is able to "see
6

what some would describe as bouncing in the eyes as it tries to catch up or predict
where that object is going/' R. 459: 39. According to Officer Jennings7 training, a
failed HGN alone is ordinarily sufficient to show that a suspect's blood alcohol
concentration is above the legal limit. R. 455: 20. When Officer Jennings had
Defendant perform the HGN, he "observed nystagmus in both eyes at the
maximum deviation/' R. 110. Officer Jennings accordingly believed that Defendant
"was impaired above the per se level of .08 blood-alcohol content." R. 110.
"Officer Jennings next asked the defendant to take a PBT." R. 109. Though
PBT's have "changed in size now over the years," the version in use at the time of
this incident was "a small box" that had a straw "clipped onto the top." R. 458: 45.
Prior to beginning the test, an officer would "press a button" to "calibrate[ ] the
machine," doing an "internal test to make sure it's functioning properly." R. 458:45.
At that point, the suspect would "blow into one end of the straw so that the machine
can take its sample . . . to determine the presence of alcohol." R. 458: 45. The PBT
would then give an "estimated" amount of the suspect's blood alcohol
concentration. R. 456: 76.
Although Officer Jennings had been instructed to record the PBT's precise
measurement in his notes, he had also been instructed to not rely on it for an exact
blood alcohol calculation. R. 455:16. Instead, he simply used the PBT to confirm
7

"the presence of alcohol" in the suspect's blood. R. 455:16. He therefore regarded
the PBT as a "supplement" to the standard field sobriety tests. R. 458: 33.
When Officer Jennings asked Defendant to take the PBT, he told him "that he
didn't have to take the test." R. 455:19. Officer Jennings also made no effort to
compel Defendant to take the test through non-verbal means. Officer Jennings never
locked any doors, never drew his weapon, and never took out his handcuffs. R. 456:
69. Officer Jennings never threatened Defendant with arrest or incarceration if
Defendant refused to submit to the PBT. R. 108; 456: 63. And Officer Jennings
conducted the interview in a public place. Specifically, the ER was "under
construction at that time," so Defendant was "being treated by the emergency room
staff" in a "curtain style room" throughout the interview R. 456: 81; 458: 58.
Defendant's fiancee was "in close proximity" as well. R. 458: 46.
Defendant "did not object" to taking the test, and was "willing to take" it. R.
109; 455: 22. Officer Jennings later said that Defendant was "cooperative" during
the process. R. 456: 70.
After Defendant completed the test, the PBT estimated Defendant's blood
alcohol concentration as .107. R. 455: 8. Given the smell of alcohol on Defendant's
breath, the three 24-ounce beer cans found around Defendant's motorcycle, and the

8

failed HGN test, Officer Jennings later testified that he would have arrested
Defendant for DUI even if the PBT had "come back below .08." R. 456: 84.
Officer Jennings then "placed the defendant under arrest for driving under
the influence of alcohol." R. 109. Only five minutes had elapsed from the time that
Officer Jennings arrived at the hospital to the time that he arrested Defendant. R.
108. Defendant took the HGN and the PBT in the intervening five minutes. R. 108.
After arresting Defendant, Officer Jennings "read the DUI admonition
pursuant" to Utah's implied consent law and asked Defendant "if he would submit
to a [blood test] to determine the alcohol content level of his blood." R. 109.
Defendant said "that's okay" and "agreed to submit" to the test. R. 109; 458: 47.
A forensic nurse arrived performed the blood draw at 11:55 p.m. R. 200; 458:
78. Prior to performing the blood draw, the nurse wiped Defendant down with a
Betadine swab, rather than ethanol, so as to avoid introducing any alcohol-based
product into Defendant's blood. R. 458: 90. This blood sample was subsequently
tested by the state forensic toxicology lab. R. 458: 136. As part of that testing
process, the lab ran two different blood samples twice. R. 458: 143. The four test
results came back at .105, .105, .106, and .107. R. 458:143. Pursuant to policy, the lab
rounded down from the lowest score, thereby concluding that Defendant's B AC had
been .10 at the time of the test. R. 458:144.
9

Defendant was subsequently charged with one count of DUI. R. 1-2. The
State initially alleged that Defendant had committed DUI under one of three
different variants set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 41-6a-502(l)(a)-(c) (Supp.
2005).

But the State subsequently agreed to only proceed under Utah Code

Annotated § 41-6a-502(l)(a), which makes it illegal for a person to drive a vehicle
with "sufficient alcohol in the person's body that a subsequent chemical test shows
that the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at
the time of the test" R. 200, 221-23 (emphasis added).
Defendant filed a motion to suppress prior to trial. R. 30-38. Defendant
claimed had unconstitutionally "required" him to take the PBT, and he then argued
that the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine precluded use of all resulting evidence —
including the PBT result and the result of the blood draw. R. 30-38. The trial court
subsequently held an evidentiary hearing on this motion. R. 69; 456:1-104. At that
hearing, defense counsel specifically waived any claim that Defendant was in
custody when Officer Jennings spoke with him in the ambulance or in the hospital.
R. 456:94-96. Instead, counsel acknowledged that his motion was based only on his
claim that the officers had "require[d]" Defendant to take the PBT. R. 456: 94-96.
The trial court subsequently issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
rejecting Defendant's claim. R. 97-114.
10

Prior to trial, Defendant also provided notice that he intended to call Gary
Potter as an expert witness. R. 134. According to the attached curriculum vitae,
Potter was a licensed private detective who had previously been a sheriffs deputy.
R. 126-32. Defendant explained that he intended to have Potter testify regarding
two issues.

First, he intended to have Potter testify about "the procedures

established concerning blood draws and other variables/' R. 159. According to
Defendant, this would allow him to argue that "prior to taking the blood test, [he]
was subjected to treatment for injuries which could have involved cleaning of his
wounds with alcohol," thereby resulting in the elevated blood alcohol content as
measured by the blood draw. R. 163. Second, he intended to have Potter testify
about blood alcohol absorption rates.

R. 163. According to Defendant, this

testimony would show that blood alcohol rates sometimes continue rising after a
suspect has stopped driving a vehicle, thus indicating that the suspect was not
above the legal limit while actually operating the vehicle. R. 134,161.
The State objected on two grounds. First, the State argued that Potter was not
qualified to offer the proposed testimony; and second, the State argued that
Defendant's blood alcohol concentration at the time of the accident was irrelevant,

11

given that he was only charged with violating Utah Code Annotated § 41-6a502(l)(a). R. 138-41.3
In response, Defendant filed a motion arguing that § 41-6a-502(l)(a) was
unconstitutionally vague. R. 158-65,176-180. Following a hearing, however, the
trial court denied Defendant's vagueness challenge. R. 200-01. The court also ruled
that while Potter was not qualified to testify regarding "defendant's medical
records" or "where his blood should have been drawn," he would be allowed to
testify regarding the "Widmark formula," which is used to determine blood alcohol
absorption rates. R. 225-26.
Defendant's trial began on September 29, 2008. R. 281-82. Prior to the
beginning of the trial, the court informed the parties that it had reconsidered its
earlier ruling regarding Potter's proposed testimony.

R. 457: 94. The court

explained that since the State was only relying on § 41-6a-502(l)(a), "any testimony
that would be proffered or requested that would go to what [Defendant's] blood
alcohol or breath alcohol concentration would have been at the time of the accident"
would be "irrelevant." R. 457: 98-99. As such, the court concluded that there was

3

As noted above, Utah Code Annotated § 41-6a-502(l)(a) only focuses on
whether the person's blood alcohol concentration is ".08 grams or greater at the time
of the test."
12

no basis to introduce any expert testimony regarding the application of the
Widmark formula to this case. R. 457: 94-98.
During the ensuing trial, the State explained to the jury that the sole basis for
the charge was the blood draw that had occurred after Defendant's arrest. R. 458:58. The State did not rely on the PBT as support for its claim, but instead relied on
testimony from its experts showing that Defendant's blood alcohol concentration
was 10 at the time of the test. R. 458: 143-44; 72-77. Following deliberations, the
jury convicted Defendant. R. 356-58.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Issue I: Defendant claims that he was unconstitutionally coerced to take the
PBT. But the trial court's uncontested factual findings show that Officer Jennings
asked Defendant to take the test while in a publicly accessible room with other
people present, that Officer Jennings' request was not accompanied by any show of
force or coercive act, and that Defendant voluntarily agreed to take the test.
Defendant also claims that Officer Jennings could not even request that he
take the PBT without probable cause that Defendant was driving while intoxicated.
But this is inconsistent with prior Utah decisions that have allowed officers to
request consent for such a test prior to arrest. In any event, the trial court below also

13

correctly noted that a PBT is the functional equivalent of a field sobriety test, which
can requested with reasonable suspicion alone.
Finally, Defendant claims that PBT's are inherently reliable and should not be
considered in determining probable cause for arrest. But Defendant has not
identified which PBT was actually used in this case, let alone pointed to any
problem with this particular device. As such, his claim is inadequately briefed. In
any event, the PBT at issue here produced a blood alcohol calculation that was
ultimately consistent with the results reached by testing Defendant's blood sample.
Thus, if anything, this record demonstrates that PBT's are reliable.
Issue II: Defendant claims that the trial court violated his due process rights
by excluding his proposed expert testimony on certain medical issues, as well as on
his likely blood alcohol concentration at the time he was driving his motorcycle.
But Defendant has not challenged the trial court's conclusion that his expert
was not qualified to testify regarding the medical issues. Thus, that claim is not
properly before this Court. And although Defendant claims that his expert should
have also been permitted to testify regarding blood alcohol absorption rates, the
State limited the prosecution in this case to a sub-provision of the DUI statute that
was not based on Defendant's blood alcohol concentration at the time he was

14

driving. Thus, the trial court correctly concluded that the proposed testimony was
irrelevant to this particular prosecution.
Issue III: Finally, Defendant claims that Utah Code Annotated § 41-6a502(1)(a) is vague. Defendant has not only failed to properly brief this claim, but he
has also failed to show that he has standing to raise it. In any event, the plain
language of this statute prohibits a person from consuming sufficient alcohol to
become intoxicated and then driving. A person of reasonable intelligence would
understand its prohibitions, and Defendant's vagueness challenge therefore fails.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO SUPPRESS

DENIED

Defendant raises two different claims regarding the PBT. Aplt. Br. 16-25.
Defendant first argues that he was coerced into taking the PBT; and as a result,
Defendant asks this Court to reverse the trial court's denial of his suppression
motion. Aplt. Br. 16-19. Second, Defendant argues that even if the PBT was
properly administered, its result could not be used as part of the probable cause
determination or as substantive evidence of his guilt. Aplt. Br. 19-22. These
arguments should both be rejected.

15

A. Officer Jennings did not coerce Defendant into taking the PBT.
"In determining whether voluntary consent was given for a warrantless
search, we have a two-prong analysis. A consent is valid only if (1) the consent was
given voluntarily, and (2) the consent was not obtained by police exploitation of [a]
prior illegality/' State v. Tripp, 2010 UT 9, ^ 27, - Adv. Rep. --. In this case, the
evidence clearly showed that both prongs of this analysis were satisfied.
1. Defendant voluntarily consented to take the PBT.
"For a defendant to voluntarily consent to a search the defendant must (A)
actually consent to the search and (B) consent must be voluntary." Id. The supreme
court has cautioned against "conflating" these two separate aspects of this analysis.
Id. at Tf 29. Both are satisfied here.
Actual consent: A trial court's conclusion that a suspect actually consented to
a search "is a factual finding, and it is based on the totality of the circumstances." Id.
at ^ 30. Given the trial court's "unique position to assess the credibility of witnesses
and weigh the evidence,... an appellate court should defer to the factual findings of
the trial court unless the findings are clearly erroneous." Id. (quotations omitted).
In this case, the trial court found that "Officer Jennings . . . asked the
defendant to take a PBT. The defendant did not object and the officer administered
the test." R. 109. The court additionally found that Defendant had also "agreed to
16

take the PBT," and it accordingly concluded "that the defendant voluntarily
consented to the administration of the PBT/7 R. 100.
Although Defendant now argues that he was coerced into taking this test, he
has not directly challenged the trial court's factual findings to the contrary. He has
not marshaled the evidence as required by rule 24(a)(9), and he has not argued that
the court's factual findings were clearly erroneous. Given these marshaling failures,
this Court should assume that the evidence supports the court's finding that he
voluntarily consented to the administration of the PBT. See State v. Green, 2005 UT 9,
113,108 P.3d 710.4
Voluntariness: The trial court also determined that Defendant's consent was
voluntarily given. R. 100-01. "The voluntariness of consent to a search is a legal
conclusion, which is reviewed for correctness." Tripp, 2010 UT 9, % 36 (quotations
and citation omitted). This analysis "requires careful scrutiny of the details of the
detention, and the characteristics of the defendant. And the totality of the
circumstances must show consent was given without duress or coercion." Id. at

4

In any event, Officer Jennings testified that although he told Defendant
"that he didn't have to take the test," Defendant was nevertheless "willing to take"
it. R. 455:19, 22; see also R. 456: 70-71. Officer Jennings also testified that Defendant
was "cooperative" during this process. R. 456: 70-71. Given this, the court's finding
was not clearly erroneous.
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Tf 37. In examining such claims, courts commonly look to "five factors that may
show a lack of duress or coercion: (1) the absence of a claim of authority to search
by the officers; (2) the absence of an exhibition of force by the officers; (3) a mere
request to search; (4) cooperation by the [suspect]; and (5) the absence of deception
or trickery on the part of the officer/7 Id. (quotations and citation omitted). Even if
one factor "tends to weigh against voluntariness, under the totality of the
circumstances, other factors... coupled with Defendant's cooperation/' can lead to
a conclusion that "Defendant's consent was voluntary and not coerced." State v.
Humphrey, 2006 UT App 221,124,138 P.3d 590.
In reviewing such claims, the trial court's application of the legal standard is
ultimately a legal question, but its underlying factual findings are accepted by the
appellate court unless shown to be clearly erroneous. Tripp, 2010 UT 9, ^ 23. As
noted above, Defendant has not properly challenged any of the trial court's findings
on this issue. As such, this Court should assume that those findings are supported
by the evidence. Green, 2005 UT 9,113.
Viewed under this standard, this Court should affirm the trial court's
conclusion that Defendant's consent was not coerced.
First, this test was not the result of any "claim of authority." Tripp, 2010 UT 9,
<JI 37. To the contrary, the trial court specifically found that Officer Jennings "never
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told the defendant that he would arrest him if the defendant didn't submit to the
PBT test." R. 110. And Officer Jennings similarly testified that he did not "claim
any authority to do the portable breath test without [Defendant's] consent" R. 456:
70-71.
Second, this test was not the result of an "exhibition of force." Tripp, 2010 UT
9, f 37. The trial court specifically "adopt[ed] the officers' version of the facts
surrounding the administration of the HGN and the PBT." R. 106. Officer Jennings
testified that he did not have any other officer with him, and that he did not ever
lock any doors, draw his weapon, or take out his handcuffs. R. 456; 69. Moreover,
Officer Jennings did not attempt to pressure Defendant by conducting the interview
in an isolated setting. Instead, he spoke with Defendant while Defendant was
"being treated by the emergency room staff" in a "curtain style room," with his
fiancee "in close proximity" the entire time. R. 456: 81; 458: 46, 58.
Third, this test resulted from a "mere request." Tripp, 2010 UT 9, ^ 37. The trial
court found that Officer Jennings had "simply asked the defendant if he could
administer the HGN and the portable breath test." R. 100. And Officer Jennings
testified that he told Defendant "that he didn't have to take the test." R. 455: 19.
Defendant "did not object," but was instead "willing to take" it. R. 109; 455: 22.
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Fourth, this test was coupled with "cooperation from [Defendant]." Tripp,
2010 UT 9, Tf 37. The trial court found that Defendant "fully cooperated and agreed
to take the PBT." R. 100. And Officer Jennings similarly testified that Defendant
was "cooperative" when asked to blow into the machine. R. 456: 70.
Fifth, Defendant has not pointed to any instance in which Officer Jennings
used "deception or trickery" to secure his compliance. Tripp, 2010 UT 9, If 37. And
the trial court specifically found that there "is nothing in the evidence presented"
indicating that deception or trickery was used. R. 1000, See also R. 456: 63.
In spite of this, Defendant now claims that he was "required" to take the test.
Aplt. Br. 4, 19.

In support, Defendant points to his own testimony from the

suppression hearing, during which he said that he was told that he would be
arrested and taken to jail if he did not take the PBT. Aplt. Br. 4,19.
But Officer Jennings flatly denied this in both the preliminary hearing and the
suppression hearing. R. 455: 18; 456: 62, 70. At the suppression hearing, for
example, the following exchange occurred:
Q: Did -was there any more conversation about blowing into the
portable breath test?
Officer Jennings: Not that I could remember.
Q: Did he say anything like, 'If I don't do it, will you arrest me?"
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Officer Jennings; I remember him asking me if he would go to jail; and
I told him no.

Q: Okay. Did you claim any authority to do the portable breath test
without his consent?
Officer Jennings: No.
R. 456: 70-71.
The trial court "adopt[ed] the officers' version of the facts surrounding the
administration of . . . the PBT, finding their testimony to be more reliable." R. 106.
And the trial court specifically found that "Officer Jennings never told the defendant
that he was going to jail, never brought the issue up, and testified that he had no
intention of taking the defendant to jail, due to the extent of the defendant's
injuries." R. 108.
In short, there was nothing coercive about Defendant's consent.

Officer

Jennings approached Defendant in a public place with other people around and
asked him if he would take the test, and Officer Jennings did so without threat or
show of force. Defendant then willingly agreed to take the test. As such, the trial
court correctly concluded that Defendant voluntarily consented to take this test.
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2, Defendant's consent was not the product of any police
illegality.
As noted above, Defendant can also prevail if he shows that the search "was
... obtained by police exploitation of [a] prior illegality/' Tripp, 2010 UT 9, % 27. In
this case, Defendant argues that Officer Jennings could not even request that he take
a PBT without probable cause. Aplt. Br. 19-20. This argument should be rejected.
There is no Utah decision specifically addressing the standard for requesting a
PBT. And Defendant is correct that some states — either by statute or case law — do
require officers to have probable cause of DUI before even requesting a PBT. See,
e.g., People v. Chowdhury, 775 N.W.2d 845,850-54 (Mich. App. 2009); State v. Begicevic,
678 N.W.2d 293, 296-97 (Wis. App. 2004).
But the clear majority of courts have rejected that position. A number have
done so explicitly, expressly holding that an officer can request a PBT based on
reasonable suspicion alone. See State v. WJtitney, 889 N.E.2d 823, 829 (Ind. App.
2008); State v. Vonderharr, 733 N.W.2d 847,854 (Minn. App. 2007); State v. Huettl, 379
N.W.2d 298,305 (S.D. 1985); State v. McGuigan, 965 A.2d 511,516-17 (Vt. 2008). And
a number of courts have done so implicitly, holding that an officer can use a PBT to
develop probable cause. See, e.g., United States v. Iron Cloud, 171 F.3d 587,590-91 (8th
Cir. 1999); People v. Kavanaugh, 840 N.E.2d 807, 812 (111. App. 2005); State v. Gray, 18
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P.3d 962, 966 (Kan. 2001); State v. Morgenroth, 227 S.W.3d 517, 522 (Mo.App. 2007);
People v. Thomas, 121 A.D.2d 73, 76-77 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986); Commonwealth v.
Marshall 824 A.2d 323, 328 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
The Utah Supreme Court has implicitly accepted this position as well. As
noted by Defendant in his brief, a request for a breath test is ordinarily governed by
the Utah's implied consent law, which is set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 41-6a520 (West 2004). In State v. Cruz, 446 P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 1968), however, the
supreme court determined that implied consent only arises after a person has been
arrested. But prior to arrest—i.e. prior to the development of probable cause — ,
officers may administer a breath test if they obtain "actual consent" from the
suspect. Id.; accord In re R.L.L, 771 P.2d 1068,1069-70 (Utah 1989). Although not
expressly stated, it stands to reason that an officer must be allowed to request
consent in order to obtain it. Thus, Cruz and In re R.L.L clearly suggest that an
officer can request a PBT without probable cause.
This conclusion is also supported by the nature of the test itself. Other courts
that have examined such claims have differentiated between PBT's and standard
breathalyzers. Unlike a breathalyzer, a PBT is not ordinarily used as substantive
proof of a suspect's specific blood alcohol concentration. Rather, a PBT is ordinarily
used as a "screening device" to "provide[ ] . . . a threshold determination whether a
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person has consumed alcohol/7 Whitney, 889 N.E.2d at 827,828. In this manner, a
PBT performs the same function as a field sobriety test. See, e.g., Iron Cloud, 171 F.3d
at 591; Gray, 18 P.3d at 966; McGuigan, 965 A.2d at 517. As such, courts have seen
"no difference in the officer's use of the [PBT] than in the use of manual dexterity
tests such as the finger-to-nose test, to determine intoxication/' Whitney, 889 N.E.2d
at 828 (quotations and citation omitted).
Officer Jennings drew a similar comparison below, referring to the PBT as "a
sobriety test" that simply confirms "the presence of alcohol" in a suspect's blood. R.
455:16; 456: 79. And in its ruling, the trial court likewise stated that she "views the
PBT as nothing more than a field sobriety test, akin to the HGN, the one-leg stand,
and the walk-and-turn tests." R. 105.
In Utah, an officer can request that a suspect perform a field sobriety test as
long as there is reasonable suspicion that the suspect was driving while intoxicated.
See, e.g., State v. Rogue, 2007 UT App 86, U 7,157 P.3d 826. Thus, Officer Jennings
needed nothing more than reasonable suspicion to request this test.
But even if probable cause was required, there was no error in this case
because, as the trial court ruled, Officer Jennings already had probable cause when
he requested that Defendant take the PBT. Probable cause exists when "a man of
reasonable caution" would believe "that an offense has been or is being committed."
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State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, % 34,164 P.3d 397 (quotations and citation omitted).
"Probable cause is evaluated under the totality of the circumstances and deals with
probabilities and 'certain common-sense conclusions about human behavior'
formulated by law enforcement officers." Tripp, 2010 UT 9, f 48 (quoting Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983)).

Moreover, the "validity of the probable cause

determination is made from the objective standpoint of a 'prudent, reasonable,
cautious police officer ... guided by his experience and training. " State v. Despain,
2007 UT App 367, % 9,173 P.3d 213 (quotations and citation omitted).
In this case, Officer Jennings and Officer Bascom both smelled a "strong odor
of alcohol" on Defendant's breath when talking to him in the ambulance. R. 111-12;
456: 62. Officer Jennings also found three unopened 24-ounce cans of beer next to
Defendant's motorcycle after the accident. R. 111. And finally, when Defendant
performed the HGN, Officer Jennings "observed nystagmus in both eyes at the
maximum deviation/' R. 110, which was significant because Officer Jennings'
training had shown that a failed HGN alone shows that a suspect's blood alcohol
concentration was above the legal limit. R. 455: 20. Given these indicators, Officer
Jennings reasonably believed that Defendant had been driving his motorcycle while
intoxicated even before requesting the PBT.
*****
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In short, the trial court's findings demonstrate that Defendant voluntarily
consented to the take the PBT, and that this test was not the product of any police
illegality. As a result, the PBT was properly administered, and the trial court
correctly concluded that the subsequent evidence — including the blood draw—was
admissible.
B. The results of the PBT were admissible as part of the probable
cause determination.
In addition to challenging Officer Jennings' basis for requesting the PBT,
Defendant also argues that the test itself is inherently unreliable. Aplt. Br. 21-22. As
a result, Defendant argues that PBT's should not be considered in determining
probable cause. Aplt. Br. 21-22. This argument should be rejected for three reasons.
First, the argument is inadequately briefed. Under Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, an appellant's brief must "contain the contentions and
reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds
for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." As Utah courts have
frequently reiterated, "a reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined
with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the appealing
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party may dump the burden of argument and research/' State v. Gomez, 2002 UT
120, f 20, 63 P.3d 72.
In this case, Defendant makes a number of broad claims about the reliability
of PBT's. Aplt. Br. 21-23. But as the trial court noted, he has failed to identify which
device was actually used in his test, let alone the supposed defects in that device's
testing capabilities. This failure is significant given the large number of testing
machines that qualify as PBT's. At the time of this incident, the NHTSA had
approved 129 different devices for measuring breath alcohol, 121 of which could be
used in a "mobile" fashion such as this case. 72 Fed. Reg. 71480-02 (Dec. 17, 2007)
(Addendum B).5
The variety of devices was further confirmed by the testimony below. When
asked about the PBT that was used here, Officer Jennings specifically noted that the
device he used with Defendant had since been replaced by a different model. R.
458: 44-45.
Thus, while Defendant has made a number of general claims about the
alleged unreliability of PBTs, he has made no claim about the reliability of the
particular device that was used here. As a result, the trial court properly refused to
5

The NHTSA has since added four additional devices to that list. See 75 Fed.
Reg. 11624-01 (March 11, 2010).
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consider this claim on its merits. R. 105-06. This Court should likewise disregard
his claim as inadequately briefed.
Second, a number of courts have examined similar claims and concluded that
while PBT's are not as accurate as stationary breathalyzers, they may be used for
purposes of determining probable cause. See, e.g., Iron Cloud, 171 F.3d at 590-91;
Boyd v. City of Montgomery, 472 So.2d 694, 697 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985); Attix v.
Voshell, 579 A.2d 1125,1129 (Del.Super.Ct. 1989); Kavanaugh, 840 N.E.2d at 812; Gray,
18 P.3d at 966; State v. Strizich, 952 P.2d 1365,1371 (Mont. 1997); State v. Klingelhoefer,
382 N.W.2d 366, 369-70 (Neb. 1986); Morgenroth, 227 S.W.3d at 522; Thomas, 121
A.D.2d at 77; Marshall, 824 A.2d at 328; Jones v. Town of Marion, 508 S.E.2d 921, 923
(Va.App. 1999).
Some states admittedly hold to the contrary, preventing the prosecution from
relying on a PBT, even for probable cause. See, e.g., Harmon v. State, 809 A.2d 696,
703-05 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002); Thompson v. State Dept. of Licensing, 982 P.2d 601,
786 n.l (Wash. 1999). But such results are ordinarily dictated by a specific state
statute. See Harmon, 809 A.2d at 703-05; State v. Smith, 922 P.2d 811, 815 (Wash.
1996). There is no such statute in Utah, however, and in the absence of any
testimony regarding the reliability of the particular device in use here, this Court
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should decline Defendant's invitation to issue a blanket ruling forbidding the use of
all such devices in all probable cause determinations.
Third, the evidence in this case refutes Defendant's claim. Specifically, the
PBT that Defendant took estimated his blood alcohol as .107. R. 455: 8. When
Defendant's blood was tested by the state forensic lab, the four test results came
back at .105, .105, .106, and .107. R. 458:143. Thus, Defendant is asking this Court
to conclude that PBT's are inherently unreliable, even though the PBT that was used
here proved to be as reliable as a blood analysis that was done at the State forensic
lab. Given this, there is no factual basis on this record with which to invalidate the
results of these tests.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT PREVENTED
DEFENDANT FROM PRESENTING EXPERT TESTIMONY ON
BLOOD ALCOHOL ABSORPTION RATES
Under the DUI statute in effect at the time of this prosecution, a person could
be prosecuted for DUI under one of the three subsections set forth in Utah Code
Annotated § 41-6a-502(l)(a) to (c). As noted above, however, the State limited its
prosecution in this case to Utah Code Annotated § 41-6a-502(l)(a). R. 200, 221-23.
Under that provision, a "person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a
vehicle within this state if the person: (a) has sufficient alcohol in the person's body
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that a subsequent chemical test shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol
concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of the test."
Prior to trial, Defendant provided notice of his intent to call Gary Potter as an
expert on (1) "the procedures established concerning blood draws and other
variables," and (2) blood alcohol absorption rates. R. R. 159,163. The trial court
ultimately prevented Potter from testifying regarding either aspect of this case. R.
225-26; 457:98-99. Defendant now argues that these rulings violated his due process
rights by preventing him from presenting a valid defense. Aplt. Br. 25-33. Both
arguments should be rejected.
First, the trial court did not err when it ruled that Potter could not testify
about "the procedures established concerning blood draws and other variables." R.
159. Although Defendant argues that this testimony could have shown that his
blood alcohol level was actually the result of his post-accident medical treatment,
Aplt. Br. 29, the trial court concluded that Potter was not qualified to testify
regarding any "medical issues." R. 201,225-27. This ruling was correct. Potter had
no medical training at all, but was instead a high school graduate who had taken
some undefined community courses in the early 1970s. R. 126-32. Moreover,
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Defendant has not directly challenged the trial court's qualification ruling on
appeal. Given this failure, this claim should be rejected for this reason alone.6
Second, Defendant also intended to have Potter testify about "the absorption
rate of alcohol into a person's system" and "the expected blood alcohol level at the
time of the actual operation of the vehicle by the Defendant." R. 134. Defendant
subsequently argued that this testimony would have shown that regardless of what
his blood alcohol test was at the time of the blood draw, it was not "above the legal
limit at the time of his actual operation of the vehicle." R. 164.
Although the trial court initially approved this testimony, it ultimately
reconsidered and concluded that the proposed testimony would be irrelevant to this
prosecution. R. 457:94. The court explained that since the State was only relying on
§ 41-6a-502(l)(a), "any testimony that would be proffered or requested that would
go to what [Defendant's] blood alcohol or breath alcohol concentration would have
been at the time of the accident" would be "irrelevant." R. 457: 98-99.
Defendant argues that this ruling deprived him of his constitutional right to
present a defense. Aplt. Br. 25-33. But it is well-established that a defendant does
6

In any event, the forensic nurse who took the blood sample specifically
testified that he had used a Betadine swab, rather than ethanol, so as to avoid
introducing any alcohol-based product into Defendant's blood. R. 458: 90.
Defendant points to no evidence in the record contradicting this claim.
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not have a constitutional right to present irrelevant evidence. To the contrary,"State
and federal rulemakers have broad latitude under the Constitution to establish rules
excluding evidence from criminal trials," and the Constitution therefore "permits
judges to exclude evidence" that is irrelevant or even "marginally relevant." Homes
v. South Carolina, 5^7 U.S. 319,324 (2006) (quotations and citation omitted); see also
State v. Williams, 773 R2d 1368,1372-73 (Utah 1989) (holding that the defendant had
no constitutional right to present irrelevant evidence regarding a rape victim's prior
sexual activity); State v. Holm, 2006 UT 31,137 P.3d 726 (affirming a trial court's
decision to exclude proposed expert testimony that would not have "aid[ed] the
trier of fact in determining the factual questions before it"); State v. Clark, 2009 UT
App 252, 219 P.3d 631; State v. Hobbs, 2003 UT App 27, If 26, 64 P.3d 1218 (holding
that a trial court does not commit error by "exclud[ing] evidence relating to a
defense that is no longer available").
Here, the trial court excluded the proposed testimony because of its
determination that it would be irrelevant under a prosecution for violating Utah
Code Annotated § 41-6a-502(l)(a). R. 457: 98-99. That ruling was correct.
"When interpreting statutes, we first look to the plain language of the statute
and give effect to that language unless it is ambiguous. Thus, a statutory provision
should be read literally, unless it would result in an unreasonable or inoperable
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result." State v. Jeffries, 2009 UT 57, If 7,217 P.3d 265. When separate provisions of a
statute are at issue, courts interpret the provisions "in harmony" with each other.
Id. at f 9. "In essence, statutes should be construed . . . so that no part or provision
will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant." Id. (quotations and
citation omitted).
As noted above, the statute provided three different ways for the State to
prove that a defendant was driving while intoxicated. See generally Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-6a-502(l)(a) to -(c). While Subsections -502(l)(a) and -502(l)(c) both involved
blood alcohol testing, the plain language shows that these two subsections address
very different problems.
Under Subsection -502(1)(c), a person "may not operate or be in actual
physical control of a vehicle . . . if the person: (c) has a blood or breath alcohol
concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of operation or actual physical
control." (Emphasis added).

And under Subsection -502(1)(a) —which is the

provision at issue in this case —,"a person may not operate or be in actual physical
control of a vehicle... if the person: (a) has sufficient alcohol in the person's body that
a subsequent chemical test shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol
concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of the test!' (Emphases added).
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As noted by the added emphases, Subsection -502(1)(a) contains two
significant differences from Subsection -502(1) (c). The first is that Subsection
-502(l)(a) does not focus on the blood alcohol concentration at the time the
defendant was operating the vehicle; rather, it only focuses on the blood alcohol
concentration at the time of a "subsequent chemical test/' The second difference is
that, unlike Subsection -502(l)(c), Subsection -502(l)(a) does not require that the
alcohol have metabolized into the bloodstream at the time the defendant was
driving the vehicle. To the contrary, Subsection -502(l)(a) expands the inquiry by
allowing prosecution when there is "sufficient alcohol in the person's body/' such that
the "subsequent chemical test" shows a concentration of .08 grams or greater "at
the time of the test."
These two subsections therefore address distinct problems. The difference is
illustrated by the following scenarios:
Scenario 1: A campus police officer observes a student consume several large
alcoholic drinks at a party. Three hours later, the officer sees the student walk to her
car and drive away. The officer noticed a slight tilt to her walking, so he pulls her
over for a suspected DUI.

After conducting an investigation, he obtains her

permission for a blood draw. Analysis subsequently shows that her blood alcohol
concentration at the time of the test was .785, but an analyst testifies that based on
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blood alcohol absorption rates, the student's blood alcohol concentration would
have been above .08 at the time she was operating the vehicle. If that testimony was
accepted by the jury, this student would be guilty of violating Subsection -502(1 )(c),
because her blood alcohol concentration was above the legal limit while she was
driving.
Scenario 2: A campus police officer observes a student consume several large
alcoholic drinks at a party, after which she immediately gets in her car and drives
away. The officer pulls her over and obtains her permission for a blood draw. The
forensic analysis subsequently shows that she had a blood alcohol concentration of
.08 at the time of the test. But when blood alcohol absorption rates are factored in,
the analyst also concludes that her blood alcohol levels had not yet reached .08 at
the time of the stop itself.
Under this scenario, the student would not be guilty under Subsection
-502(l)(c), due to the fact that her blood alcohol concentration had not yet reached
.08 while she was "operating the vehicle." But she would be guilty under
Subsection -502(l)(a), due to the fact that she had "sufficient alcohol in [her] body"
such that a "subsequent chemical test" showed that her blood alcohol concentration
had risen to .08 grams or greater "at the time of the test."
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Contrary to Defendant's suggestion, the State clearly has an interest in
criminalizing both types of behavior. The purpose of the DUI statute is to prevent
people from driving once they have consumed enough alcohol to become impaired.
This not only applies to people who are already impaired, but also to those who are
becoming progressively impaired due to alcohol that is currently metabolizing in
their system. Thus, Subsection 502(1) (a) closes a potential loophole in the DUI
structure. Without it, people who had drunk large amounts of alcohol would have
an incentive to try driving home before their blood alcohol had metabolized and
reached the legal limit. This subsection removes that incentive.
More importantly for purposes of this case, the plain language of Subsection
-502(1) (a) clearly forestalls a defense that is based on the blood alcohol concentration
at the time of the operation of the vehicle. Instead, the only questions before a jury
in a Subsection -502(l)(a) prosecution are: (1) whether the alcohol was in the
defendant's body at the time of the stop, and (2) whether that alcohol resulted in a
blood alcohol concentration of .08 or greater at the time of the subsequent chemical
test.
Here, Defendant could have prevailed by disproving either of these elements.
First, he could have attempted to show that the alcohol in his system at the time of
the test was ingested after he operated the vehicle. But Defendant has never
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claimed that he was drinking alcohol while being treated in the ER, and he never
offered any testimony from a qualified expert to show that his medical treatment
would have resulted in an elevated blood alcohol concentration. Second, Defendant
could have also attacked the validity of the blood test itself, such as by claiming that
the test procedures were flawed, or by instead pointing to a problem with the chain
of custody. The trial court expressly allowed Defendant to do this, and Defendant
therefore presented such evidence throughout the trial. R. 458: 78-83, (challenging
the chain of custody on the blood sample), 92-98 (same), 141-43 (same), 148-50
(same); R. 458:150-59 (challenging the accuracy of the blood testing).
But given the limited nature of this prosecution, the State was not required to
prove that Defendant's blood alcohol concentration was already .08 at the time he
was operating his motorcycle. And even if Defendant had been able to prove that it
had not yet reached that level, this would not have constituted a defense under
Subsection -502(l)(a). Thus, the trial court was correct when it concluded that the
proposed testimony regarding Defendant's blood alcohol concentration while he
was driving was irrelevant. Defendant's claim should therefore be rejected.
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III.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 41-6A-502(l)(a) IS NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE
Finally, Defendant argues that Utah Code Annotated § 41-6a-502(l)(a) was
unconstitutionally vague. Aplt, Br. 33-37. This claim should be rejected for three
reasons.
First, Defendant's claim is inadequately briefed. Under rule 24(a)(9), Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, a party must support an argument" with citations to
the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." To satisfy this rule, a
party must offer more than ''just bald citation to authority/' State v. Thomas, 961
P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Rather, the
party must also provide "development of that authority and reasoned analysis
based on that authority," id., thereby "plead[ing] his claims with sufficient
specificity for this court to make a ruling on the merits." Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56,
1f 9,194 P.3d 903. In Mi Vida Enterprises v. Steen-Adams, 2005 UT App 400, f 16 n.5,
122 P.3d 144, this Court accordingly refused to review a claim where the party had
quoted from the statute and "cite[d] several cases," but still failed to "apply the
statute and case law to the facts of this case."
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Here, Defendant generally claims that § 41-6a-502(l)(a) is vague. Aplt. Br. 3337. But although he cites to several cases discussing vagueness, he makes little
effort to apply the governing principles to this particular statute. For example,
while Defendant acknowledges that a statute is only facially vague if it "is
impermissibly vague in all of its applications/' Aplt. Br. 34, he does not then argue,
let alone demonstrate, that § 41-6a-502(l)(a) is vague in all of its applications.
Similarly, while Defendant acknowledges that a statute is void for vagueness "if its
prohibitions are not clearly defined/' Aplt. Br. 35, he makes no effort to demonstrate
why this statute's prohibitions are unclear. Given this, this Court should not
consider this argument on its merits.
Second, even if properly briefed, Defendant lacks standing to raise the claim.
"[T]o establish standing to challenge [a statute on] vagueness [grounds], a
defendant has the burden of proving the statute is impermissibly vague in all of its
applications." State v. Ansari, 2004 UT App 326, ^ 44,100 P.3d 231 (quotations and
citation omitted). A defendant who "engages in some conduct that is clearly
proscribed" by the statute cannot make that showing because, necessarily, the
challenged statute is not impermissibly vague as applied to him. Id. (quotations and
citation omitted). In other words, a defendant who is not injured by a statute has no
standing "to complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of
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othei s." Id. (quotations and citation omitted). A court reviewing a defendant's
standing to raise a vagueness challenge "should therefore examine the [defendant's]
conduct before analyzing other hypothetical applications of the law." Village of
Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495.
As discussed above, Subsection -502(1) (a) made it illegal for a person to
"operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle . . . if the person has sufficient
alcohol. . . thai a subsequent chemical test shows that the person has a blood or
breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of the test." Here,
Defendant told Officer Jennings that he was driving his motorcycle at the time of the
accident, R. 458: 36, and a subsequent test of Defendant's blood showed a blood
alcohol concentration of .10. R. 458: 144.

The jury accepted this evidence and

convicted Defendant, and Defendant has not challenged that result on appeal for
insufficiency of the evidence. Thus, Defendant has "engage[d] in some conduct that
is clearly proscribed" by the statute, and he therefore lacks standing to challenge it
for vagueness,

\nsari, 2004 UT App 326,

^f 44 (quotations and citation omitted).

Third, Defendant's claim fails on its merits. As noted above, Defendant does
not specifically explain his vagueness theory, and a review of his motion below
sheds little light on the specific nature of his claim. Aplt. Br. 33-37; R. 176-80. And
although the parties argued this motion on May 9, 2008, R. 201, Defendant has not
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requested a transcript of that hearing. Based on the trial court's subsequent ruling,
however, it appears that Defendant's claim is that the statute is unconstitutional
because it does not limit the time that can pass between the time of the driving and
the time of the test. R. 200-01. If this is the claim, it fails.
"'It is a basic principle that legislative enactments are endowed with a strong
presumption of validity.'" Ansari, 2004 UT App 326, f 10 (quotations and citation
omitted). Therefore, "'[w]hen addressing a constitutional challenge to a statute,
[this Court] presume[s] that the statute is valid and resolve[s] any reasonable doubts
in favor of constitutionality.'" State v. Nieberger, 2006 UT App 5, ^ 6,128 P.3d 1223
(quoting State v. Willis, 2004 UT 93,14,100 P.3d 1218); see also State v. Maguire, 2004
UT 4, f 8, 84 P.3d 1171. This Court will strike a statute only if "'there is no
reasonable basis upon which [it] can be construed as conforming to constitutional
requirements.'" Ansari, 2004 UT App 326,110.
"A statute is [unconstitutionally] vague if it either (a) 'fails to provide people
of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it
prohibits' or (b) 'authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement/" Ansari, 2004 UT App 326, ^ 42 (citation omitted); see also Maguire,
2004 UT 4,1{ 13. "If a statute 'is sufficiently explicit to inform the ordinary reader
what conduct is prohibited,' it is not unconstitutionally vague" under the first prong
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of this test. Maguire, 2004 UT 4,114,84 P.3d 1171 (citation omitted). Similarly," [if]
the meaning of the [provision] is readily ascertainable/' it is not unconstitutionally
vague under the second prong of this test. Id. at ^ 32.
As discussed above, the statutory provisions at issue here are clear. First, the
alcohol must "be in the person's body" while operating the vehicle; and second, that
alcohol must be "sufficient" to result in blood alcohol concentration above .08 as
measured by a "subsequent chemical test." When reading this statute, a person of
reasonable intelligence would understand that he cannot drink enough alcohol to
reach the legal limit and then drive a car, regardless of whether his blood alcohol
concentration has actually risen to .08 by the time of the stop. Thus, the plain
language of Subsection -502(l)(a) "provide[s] 'the kind of notice that enables
ordinary people to understand what conduct [is prohibited]." Maguire; 2004 UT 4,
Tf 13 (citations omitted) (second set of brackets in original).
Even if properly briefed, Defendant's vagueness challenge therefore fails.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm Defendant's conviction.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO SUPPRESS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 051402975

BENSON A. MANWARING,
Division 3: Judge Claudia Laycock
Date: May 15,2007

Defendant

This matter comes before the court on the defendant's Motion 10 Suppress. Having heard
oral arguments, received evidence, and reviewed the submitted memoranda and applicable case
law, the court issues the following:

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1.

On December 14, 2005 a preliminary hearing wras conducted. At the conclusion of the
preliminary hearing, the court bound the defendant over for trial on the charge of driving
under the influence with prior convictions, a third-degree felony.

2.

The defendant filed his Motion to Suppress and Memorandum in Support of his Motion
to Suppress on December 28, 2005.

3.

On March 9, 2006 the State filed its Response to Defendant's Motion to Suppress and
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress.

O n '\ •*. *

4.

The court conducted a suppression hearing on October 11, 2006. During the hearing,
testimony was received from the defendant, Officer Kreston Bascom, and Officer Joshua
Jennings. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court allowed the parties to file posthearing memoranda.

5.

The defendant filed his Post Hearing Memorandum on December 5, 2006.

6.

The state filed its Post Hearing Response to Defendant's Post Hearing Memorandum in
Support of Motion to Suppress on March 1, 2007.

7.

The defendant filed a notice to submit on the motion on March 16, 2007.
II. FINDINGS OF FACT

1.

On June 19th, 2005 at approximately 10:00 p.m., Officer Bascom of the Provo City Police
Department responded to a traffic accident at the intersection of 1860 South and State
Street in Provo, Utah.

2.

Officer Bascom performed the accident investigation and determined that it involved a
motorcycle and an automobile.

3.

The defendant, Benson A. Manwaring, was the driver of the motorcycle. His fiance wras a
passenger. Both sustained injuries and were attended to by medical personnel in separate
ambulances. The defendant's leg was bleeding profusely.

4.

Officer Bascom first contacted the defendant in the ambulance, but not in conjunction
with a DUI investigation. Officer Bascom does not remember speaking with the
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defendant about any alcohol consumption. The defendant stated at this time that he was
the driver of the motorcycle.
5.

Officer Bascom does not remember giving the defendant a portable breath test (PBT) and
stated that he would have made a report of its administration if he had. Officer Bascom
testified at the evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress that he never saw the PBT
being administered.

6.

There is no PBT report from Officer Bascom.

7.

Upon arriving at the scene shortly thereafter, Officers Jennings observed "a black
motorcycle in the northbound facing left turn lane on State Street, the south side of the
intersection. I observed a little further south of that a Honda Accord with some air bags
deployed."

8.

While asking Officer Jennings to obtain information from the drivers of the vehicles,
Officer Bascom told Officer Jennings that he had smelled alcohol on the defendant's
breath and indicated that he suspected a DUX.

9.

After finding the defendant in an ambulance, Officer Jennings asked the defendant who
was driving the motorcycle at the time of the accident. The defendant indicated that he
was the driver.

i 0.

Officer Jennings also asked the defendant about the extent of his injuries. The defendant
indicated his belief that Ms ankle was broken, but affirmatively asserted that he did not
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have any head injuries. Officer Jennings further observed cuts and scrapes all over the
defendant's legs and road rash on his hands. Officer Jennings testified that the
paramedics did not believe that the defendant had sustained any head injury and did not
see any signs of a head injury.
11.

As the officer spoke with the defendant, he noted a strong odor of alcohol emanating
from the defendant.

12.

After speaking with the defendant, Officer Jennings returned to the motorcycle, identified
it as a Yamaha, and observed that its front tire had been damaged. He further observed
three 24-ounce vinopznzd ozn.s of beer on the ground close to the motorcycle.

13.

Officer Jennings told Officer Bascom that he would conduct the DUI portion of the
investigation.

14.

At that time, the Provo City Police Department did not have enough portable breath
testing devices (PBTs) for every officer to carry. None of the officers on the scene of the
accident carried a PBT that night. At some point, one of the officers called for a PBT to
be delivered to the scene.

15.

Approximately forty-five minutes after the accident, the medical team transported the
defendant, via ambulance, to the Utah Valley Regional Medical Center (UVRMC).
Officer Jennings told the defendant that he would meet him at the hospital.
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16.

Before going to the hospital, Officer Jennings stopped briefly at the police department to
get a DUI citation form in order to read the DUI admonitions from the form.

17.

Officer Bascom went to the hospital briefly, but did not see the defendant.

18.

After arriving at the hospital, Officer Jennings asked the defendant if he would perform
some sobriety tests. Officer Jennings never told the defendant that he would arrest him, if
the defendant didn't submit to the PBT test.

19.

The defendant indicated that he would perform the tests.

20.

Because the defendant had leg injuries, Officer Jennings did not ask the defendant to
perform the walk-and-tum test or the one-leg-stand test.

21.

Instead, Officer Jennings had the defendant perform only the horizontal-gaze nystagmus
test (HGN). The officer observed nystagmus in both eyes at the maximum deviation.
Based on this test, the officer believed that the defendant wras impaired above the per se
level of .08 blood-alcohol content (3AC).

22.

Officer Jennings did not ask the defendant to perform the ABC test, the touch-the-nose
test, or finger test because the Provo City Police Department did not recognize these tests
as standardized field sobriety tests. Additionally, the officer indicated the defendant had
road rash on his hands and the officer believed it would be difficult for the defendant to
perform any tests with his hands.
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23.

Officer Jennings next asked the defendant to take a PBT. The defendant did not object
and the officer administered the test.

24.

The PBT provided Officer Jennings with a digital readout of the defendant's blood
alcohol level. The officer testified that although the test provided a digital readout and he
recorded this digital readout of the defendant's blood alcohol content level, he had been
instructed to ignore the specific number and to only look for a positive or negative
outcome.

25.

The defendant did not personally calibrate the PBT, but understood that someone at the
police department kept the PBTs calibrated and in working order.

26.

Officer Jennings placed the defendant under arrest for driving under the influence of
alcohol.

27.

According to Officer Jennings, the defendant answered his questions appropriately, did
not have bloodshot eyes, and did not have slurred speech — characteristics often
associated with those under the influence of alcohol.

28.

Once Officer Jennings arrested the defendant, he asked the defendant if he would submit
to a chemical test (blood test) to determine the alcohol content level of his blood. The
defendant agreed to submit to this test and the officer read the DUI admonition pursuant
to Utah Code Ami. §41-6a-520, Utah's implied consent law.

Page 6 of 18

« a i n ( l

Next, the Officer Jennings gave the defendant his Miranda warnings and, subsequently,
the defendant refused to answer any questions from the interview portion of the DUI
form.
Throughout the night, the defendant kept asking the officers if he was going to be
arrested. Officer Jennings never told the defendant that he was going to jail, never
brought the issue up, and testified that he had no intention of taking the defendant to jail,
due to the extent of the defendant's injuries. The officer informed the defendant of his
intentions and reasons.
Officer Baseom testified that it was not his practice to tell people under investigation that
they would go to jail if they did not take the PBT test. Therefore, Officer Baseom does
not believe that he made any statement to the defendant which conditioned his staying out
jail upon his taking the PBT test
After the defendant continued to ask if he was going to jail, Officer Jennings finally told
the defendant that "I'm investigating a DUI and I'll make that determination."
Officer Jennings initially arrived at the hospital at 22:35 and placed the defendant under
arrest at 22:40. He administered the HGN and PBT during the intervening five minutes.
The defendant was released from the hospital around midnight. He was not taken to jail,
but was picked up by his fiance's father.
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35.

At the preliminary hearing, Officer Jennings indicated that he told the defendant that he
did not have to take the PBT.

36,

At the evidentiary hearing, the defendant testified that he began drinking Miller High Life
beer at 1 p.m. He had approximately six beers by the time he stopped drinking at
approximately 4 p.m. in the afternoon. His fiance came over to his house at
approximately 9 p.m., and they left on the motorcycle together. He did not go anywhere
else that afternoon, but stayed at his house.
III. ANALYSIS
At the evidentiary hearing, the defendant told the court that he would no longer be

pursuing any Miranda issues, specifically suppression of answers the defendant made while he
was in the ambulance, because the defendant agreed that the defendant was not in custody at that
time. Additionally, the defendant agreed that further questions of custody were not at issue and
that he was not in custody until he was placed under arrest at the hospital.
A. Credibility Issues
At the preliminary hearing, several of the facts presented by the defendant differed greatly
from those presented by the officers. Of particular importance to the instant matter are those
concerning who administered the PBT and when it wras administered. The defendant believed
that Officer Bascom—and not Officer Jennings-administered the test in the ambulance before the
defendant was taken to the hospital. Officer Bascom does not recollect administering the test nor
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seeing the test administered at any time. Additionally, Officer Bascom does not report
administering the PBT in his report.
However, Officer Jennings has a clear recollection that he administered the test at the
hospital and remembers several details surrounding his asking the defendant to take the test.
Additionally, he was the officer assigned to investigate the DUI, while Officer Bascom
investigated the accident itself. Officer Jennings remembers being with the defendant at the
hospital, while Officer Bascom does not recollect going to the hospital at all, although dispatch
logs show that he may have been there briefly. Therefore, the court adopts the officer% version
of the facts surrounding the administration of the HGN and the PBT, finding their testimony to
be more reliable. Furthermore, the defendant himself testified at the evidentiary hearing that the
HGN was administered at the hospital. It is only logical that the HGN and the PBT would have
been administered at the same time. Finally, the defendant had been drinking during the day and
had been injured in the accident, while the officers were quite sober and uninjured.
B. Accuracy of PBT
The defendant argued that the portable breath test administered by Officer Jennings was
"inaccurate and illegal." The defendant, however, did not address any inaccuracies of the PBT's
operation in his arguments. Neither has the defendant attempted to carry his burden of rebutting
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the presumption that the equipment was functioning properly as required by U.C.A. §41-6a-515.
Therefore, the court does not address that accuracy of the PBT.1
C. Actual Consent
The defendant bases his motion to suppress on his argument that the officers required to
him to submit to a pre-arrest chemical test in violation of U.C. A. §41-6a-520, the implied
consent law governing chemical testing of blood-alcohol-content levels. The defendant argues
that, because the PBT provided and Ofncer Jennings recorded a digital readout of the defendant's
blood-alcohol-content level, the PBT should be considered a chemical test and not a field
sobriety test. Therefore, the implied-eonsent statute should have been followed by Officer
Jennings in administering the test. Because the officer failed to read the defendant the DUI
admonitions as required by the statute, the defendant claims that ail subsequently obtained
evidence (specifically the blood draw) should be suppressed under the fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrine. Additionally, the defendant claims that, because the PBT should be considered a
chemical test, the implied-consent statute requires the state to meet a higher standard when

}

This court is also of the belief that U.C.A. §41-6a-515 does not apply to PBT devices, as
this statute was enacted long before the appearance and use of PBTs in DUI investigations. The
legislature did not enact this statute with the PBT in mind. Furthermore, the coun is aware of no
Utah appellate cases which have found that the PBT has satisfied the requirements of Rule 702 of
the Utah Rules of Evidence and its analysis under State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989)
and its progeny. In addition, the officer's testimony was that he has been trained to use the PBT
result to advise him as to the presence or absence of alcohol in the DUI suspect's blood. He does
not rely upon the result to advise him of the BAC, as a certified intoxilyzer would. This court
views the PBT as nothing more than a field sobriety test, akin to the HGN, the one-leg stand, and
the walk-and-turn tests.
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establishing that the defendant actually consented to the administration of the PBT. The
defendant also argues that the constitutional standards for administering the PBT require peace
officers to first obtain objective and probable cause to arrest the defendant for driving under the
influence before requiring a breath sample.
Under Utah Code Ann. §41-6A-520, the legislature implemented the following:
(l)(a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this state is considered to
have given the person's consent to a chemical test or tests of the person's breath,
blood, urine, or oral fluids for the purpose of determining whether the person was
operating or in actual control of the vehicle...
(2)(a) A peace officer requesting a test or tests shall warn a person that
refusal to submit to the test or tests may result in revocation of the person's
license to operate a motor vehicle, a five or ten-year prohibition of driving with
any measurable or detectable amount of alcohol in the person's body depending
on the person's prior driving history, and a three-year prohibition of driving
without an ignition interlock if the person: (I) has been placed under arrest; (2) has
then been requested by a peace officer to submit to any one or more of the
chemical tests under subsection (1); and (iii) refuses to submit to any chemical
test requested.
Therefore, if the court determines that the PBT is a chemical test, then implied consent
law is applicable, but only if the test is offered after arrest; otherwise, the defendant's actual
consent must be given. State v. Cruz, 446 P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 1968)("[A] person prior to arrest
has not given his implied consent to a chemical test and, therefore, his actual consent must be
given."); See also, In Interest of R.LI, 111 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1989)(Pre-arrest cases require proof
of actual consent); State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Although the language of the code limits its application to post-arrest administration of
chemical tests, the defendant relies on language in State v. Cruz to support his argument that the
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implied-consent statute requires the DUI admonitions to be given to a defendant before consent
is deemed voluntary. Consequently, the defendant argues that allowing a pre-arrest PBT without
requirmg a high standard of voluntariness is unconstitutional, as it would allow peace officers to
detain any citizen at any time to obtain breath samples without probable cause. Such use of the
PBT would allow peace officers to get around the protections set up to ensure the admission of
proper post-arrest breath samples at trial.
The defendant argues that the higher standard of voluntariness which should be used in
the instant case was set forth in State v. Webb:
(1) There must be clear and positive testimony that the consent was "unequivocal
and specific" and "freely and intelligently given"; (2) the government must prove
consent was given without duress or coercion, express or implied; and (3) the
courts indulge eveiy reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights and there must be convincing evidence that such rights were
waived.
State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
The court rejects the defendant's argument that the implied consent statute requires a
higher standard of voluntariness before a defendant can be deemed to have consented to taking
the PBT. The language in State v. Cruz relied on by the defendant is inapplicable in the instant
case. It is true that the Cruz court rejected the
"[sjtate's contention that the driver of an automobile, because of the implied
consent law, must submit to a test prior to arrest, but not after. [Adopting the
state's contention] would result in the anomalous situation of an arrested person
being afforded more rights than one not under arrest. The legislature could not
have intended such result.
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446 P.2d 307, 308 (1968)(emphasis added). However, Cruz dealt only with the circumstance
where officers administered the chemical test over the objections of the defendant who was not
arrested at the time of the tests. Cruz determined that the implied consent could not be gleaned
from a pre-arrest defendant, but required that "his actual consent must be given." Id., at 309.
Nothing in Cruz increased the standard of voluntariness as applied to the administration of prearrest chemical tests.
Further, the heightened consent standard enunciated by Webb has been specifically
rejected by Utah's Supreme Court. In State v. Bisner, the court specifically removed the third
prong, requiring an affirmative waiver of rights, from the voluntariness determination. 37 P.3d
1073, 1088 (Utah 2001). Rather, the court provided the following test:
When assessing whether consent to a warrantless search was given
voluntarily, courts in Utah must follow the same analysis we have repeatedly
applied since [the United State's Supreme Court decision in] Schneckloth:
Consent is not voluntary if it obtained as 'the product of duress or coercion,
express or implied. Factors indicating a lack of duress or coercion, which should
be assessed in the 'totality of all the surrounding circumstances,' include: 1) the
absence of a claim of authority to search by the officers; 2) the absence of an
exhibition of force by the officers; 3) a mere request to search; 4) cooperation by
the owner of the property; and 5) the absence of deception or trick on the part of
the officer.
Id.; See also, State v. Humphrey, 138 P.3d 590 (Utah Ct. App. 2006).
Therefore, the application of a higher standard of voluntariness is inappropriate in
determining whether the defendant voluntarily acquiesced to performing the PBT. In looking at
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the totality of the circumstances as required under Eisner, the court finds that the defendant
voluntarily consented to the administration of the PBT.
i. Absence of claim of authority. Officer Jennings did not extricate the defendant's
cooperation with the test through any means of duress or coercion. Although Officer Jennings
met the defendant at the hospital, he asked the defendant to consent immediately upon his
arrival at the hospital, administered the tests within five minutes of his arrival, and remained
with the defendant only after the HGN and the PBT positively affirmed his suspicions that the
defendant wras driving under the influence. His prior contact with the defendant in the
ambulance cannot be considered a show of authority, as he was simply gathering information
from the defendant concerning the accident.
ii. Absence of exhibition of force by the officers: The court finds that Officer Jennings
did not obtain consent from the defendant by showing force. During the entire time that Officer
Jennings interacted with the defendant, he never displayed any weapons or physical sign of
force. Although a number of officers were milling around the scene of the accident, the number
was reasonable considering that an accident had just occurred. None, including Officer Bascom,
displayed their weapons or made any forceful display towards the defendant. Only Officer
Bascom and Officer Jennings approached the defendant. Furthermore, at the time the request
was made of the defendant at the hospital, the defendant recalls only seeing Officer Jennings,
and Officer Jennings recalls being there without other officers in the room.
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iii. Mere request to search: According to Officer Jennings, he simply asked the
defendant if he could administer the HGN and the portable breath test. Although the defendant
was afraid that he would go to jail, this fear was not prompted by Officer Jennings. Officer
Jennings did not bring up the issue of jail and indicated that he had no intention of taking the
defendant to jail due to his injuries. At the preliminary hearing, Officer Jennings further
indicated that he told the defendant that he would not be going to jail. At some point and after
being petitioned several times by the defendant, Officer Jennings responded to the defendant
that it was up to Officer Jennings to determine whether the defendant went to jail. The court
does not find that this statement is sufficiently coercive to compel the defendant to take the PBT
at risk of going to jail. The officer's failure to remember at the evidentiary hearing that he
affirmatively told the defendant he would not go to jail is not significant to the court, based on
the extended lapse of time between the two hearings.
iv. Cooperation by the defendant: It appears that the defendant fully cooperated and
agreed to take the PBT. Nothing has been presented by way of evidence to suggest that he
refused or voiced his refusal to take the PBT.
v. Absence of deception or nick on the part of the officer: There is nothing in the
evidence presented to show that the officer tricked or deceived the defendant into taking the
PBT.
Therefore, the court finds that the defendant voluntarily consented to the administration
of the PBT and the evidence produced from the PBT should not be suppressed. Neither State v.
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Webb nor the implied-consent statute require a heightened standard of consent as to the
implementation of the PBT test.
D. Probable Cause
Additionally, even if the court did exclude the PBT findings, the court finds that
sufficient probable cause existed for the defendant to be arrested and the subsequent chemical
blood test to be administered. In State v. Kinne, the Utah Appeals Court found that where ail
breath test results were excluded, evidence did not support a finding of probable cause where:
"(1) [the defendant] was stopped for speeding; (2) he had slow and slurred speech; (3) he
admitted to having two beers; (4) the smell of alcohol emanated from his person; and (5) he
performed three mconclusive field sobriety tests." 2001 UT App 373, ^3 (unpublished decision).
Although the evidence in this case is similar to that presented in Kinne, it rises to a level
sufficient to support a finding of probable cause. Although the defendant did not have slow and
slurred speech, he had a strong odor of alcohol emanating from his breath, three unopened 24
ounce beer cans were found by his motorcycle, and he completely failed the horizontal gaze
nystagmus test approximately forty-five minutes after the accident occurred. Due to his injuries,
the defendant was unable to perform any of the other standardized field sobriety tests. The court
does not find it relevant that the officer did not have the defendant perform the ABC test or the
finger count test, as the officer testified that these are not accepted field sobriety tests by Provo
City Police Department.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Based upon the above, the court denies the defendant's motion to suppress. The state
shall prepare the appropriate order and submit it for the court's signature.

Dated this 15th day of May, 2007,
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that, on the 15th day of May, 2007,1 caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing RULING ON DEPENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS to be delivered to the
following parties:

UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
100 East Center Street, #2100
Provo, Utah 84606
RANDALL GAITHER
159 West 300 South Broadway #105
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Clerk
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72 FR 71480-02, 2007 WL 4368561 (F.R.)
NOTICES
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; Highway Safety Programs
[Docket No. NHTSA-2007-0028]
Conforming Products List of Evidential Breath Alcohol Measurement Devices
Monday, December 17, 2007
AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, DOT.
"71480 ACTION: Notice.
SUMMARY: This notice updates the Conforming Products List (CPL) published in the Federal Register on June 29, 2006 (71
FR 371593 for instruments that conform to the Mpdel_Specifications for Evidential Breath Testing Devices (58_.FR
487Q5).
DATES: Effective Date: December 17, 2007.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical issues: Ms. De Carlo Ciccel, Behavioral Research Division, NTI131, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590; Telephone;
(202) 366-1694. For legal issues: Ms. Allison Rusnak, Office of Chief Counsel, NCC-113, National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590; Telephone: (202) 366-1834.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On November 5,1973, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
published the Standards for Devices to Measure Breath Alcohol (38 FR 30459). A Qualified Products List of Evidential
Breath Measurement Devices comprised of instruments that met this standard was first issued on November 21,1974 (39 FR
On December 14,1984 (4Q FR 48854), NHTSA converted this standard to Model Specifications for Evidential Breath
Testing Devices (Model Specifications), and published a Conforming Products List (CPL) of instruments that were found
to conform to the Model Specifications as Appendix D to that notice (49 FR 48864).
On September 17,1993, NHTSA published a notice to amend the Mode] Specifications (58 FR 48705) and update the CPL.
That notice changed the alcohol concentration levels at which instruments are evaluated, from 0.000, 0.050, 0.101, and
0.151 BAC, to 0.000, 0.020, 0.040, 0.080, and 0.160 BAC. These devices are identified on the CPL with an asterisk.
Additionally, that notice includes a test for the presence of acetone and an expanded definition of "71481 alcohol to include
other low molecular weight alcohols; e.g., methyl or isopropyl. Thereafter, NHTSA has periodically updated the CPL with
those breath instruments found to conform to the Model Specifications. The most recent update to the CPL was published
June 29, 2006 (71 FR 37159).
The CPL published today adds 6 instruments that have been evaluated and found to conform to the Model Specifications, as
amended on September 17,1993, for mobile and non-mobile use. In alphabetical order by company, they are:
(1) Intoxilyzer 240 (aka: Lion Alcolmeter 400+, outside U.S.) manufactured by CMI, Inc., Owensboro, Kentucky. This is a
handheld device intended for use in stationary or roadside operations. It uses a fuel cell sensor and is powered by 5 "AA"
batteries.
(2) The "Alcotest 9510" manufactured by Draeger Safety, Inc., Durango, Colorado. This is a bench-top device intended for
use in a stationary setting. It is AC-powered and has dual sensors. The Alcotest 9510 uses both a fuel cell sensor and a 9micron infra-red type sensor to measure mouth alcohol.
(3) The "AlcoQuant 6020" manufactured by EnviteC by Honeywell GmbH, Fond du Lac, Wisconsin. This is a handheld
device intended for use in stationary or roadside operations. It uses a fuel cell sensor and is powered by 4 "AA" batteries.
(4) The "EC-IR-II (Enhanced with serial numbers above 10,000)" manufactured by Intoximeters, Inc., St. Louis, Missouri.
This is a bench-top, dual sensor device intended for stationary operations, and it is AC powered. This EC-IR-II uses a fuel cell
sensor to determine breath alcohol concentration. The device also uses an infra-red type sensor to screen for mouth alcohol.
The original EC-IR-II design was modified to incorporate additional test memory capacity, additional hardware to allow

recirculation of a wet bath simulator, and enhanced EMC and RFI immunity. This model with the enhancements has an
external and internal printer production option available.
(5) The "Phoenix 6.0" manufactured by Lifeloc Technologies, Inc., Wheat Ridge, Colorado. This is a handheld device that
uses a fuel cell sensor and is powered by an internal battery. It is intended for stationary or roadside operations. The Phoenix
6.0 has the same core electronics, fuel cell, pump, and algorithms as the Lifeloc EV30. Enhancements of the Phoenix 6.0
include high resolution display, wireless printing, barometric pressure sensor (to assist with dry gas calibrations), and Easy
Mode™ software to guide the user through the DOT testing protocol.
(6) The "ALC-PRO II (US)", manufactured by Tokai-Denshi, Inc., Tokyo, Japan. This device is a handheld battery-powered
breath tester with a fuel cell sensor. The breath tester is connected to a 10.5" by 7.5" by 5" AC powered analytical unit. It is
intended for stationary or roadside operations.
The CPL has been updated to include the six instruments identified above.
In accordance with the foregoing, the CPL is therefore updated, as set forth below
Conforming Products List of Evidential Breath Measurement Devices
Mobile
Manufacturer and model
Alcohol Countermeasure Systems Corp, Mississauga, Ontario, Canada:
Alert J3AD[FN*]
Alert J4X.ec
PBA3000C
BAC Systems, Inc., Ontario, Canada:
Breath Analysis Computer[FN*]
CAMEC Ltd., North Shields, Tyne and Ware, England:
IR Breath Analyzer[FN*]
CMI, Inc., Owensboro, Kentucky:
Intoxilyzer Model:
200
200D
240 (aka: Lion Alcolmeter 400+ outside the U.S.)
300
400
400PA
1400
40ii[FN*]
40iiA[FN*]
40iiAS[FN*]
40iiAS-A[FN*]
40iiAS-AQ[FN*]
4011 AW[FN*]
40iiA27-ioioo[FN*]
4011A27-10100 with filter[FN*]
5000
5000 (w/Cal Vapor Re-Circ.)
5000 (w/ 3/8" ID Hose option)
5000CD
5000CD/FG5
5000EN
5000 (CAL DOJ)
5000VA
8000
PAC 1200[FN*]
S-D2
S-D5 (aka: Lion Alcolmeter SD-5 outside the U.S.)
Draeger Safety, Inc. (aka: National Draeger) Durango, Colorado:
Alcotest Model:
6510
6810
70io[FN*]
7iio[FN*]
7110 MKIII
7110 MKIII-C
7410
7410 Plus

Nonmobile

X
X
X

X
X
X

X

X

X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

95io
Breathalyzer Model:
900
900A[FN*]
900BG[FN*]
7410
7410-II
EnviteC by Honeywell GmbH, Fond du Lac, Wisconsin:
AlcoQuant 6020
Gall's Inc, Lexington, Kentucky:
Alcohol Detection System-AD.S. 500
Guth Laboratories, Inc., Hamsburg, Pennsylvania:
Alcotector BAC-100
Alcotector C2H50H
Intoximeters, Inc., St. Louis, Missouri:
Photo Electric Intoximeter[FN*]
GC Intoximeter MK II[FN*]
GC Intoximeter MK IV[FN*]
Auto Intoximeter[FN*]
Intoximeter Model:
3000
3000 (rev Bi)[FN*]
3000 (rev B2)[FN*]
3000 (rev B2A)[FN*]

3000 (rev B2A) w/FM option[FN*]
3000 (Fuel Cell)[FN*]
3000 D[FN*]
3000 DFC[FN*]
Alcomonitor
Alcomonitor CC
Alco-Sensor III
Alco-Sensor III (Enhanced with Serial Numbers above 1,200,000)
Alco-Sensor IV
Alco-Sensor IV-XL
Alco-Sensor AZ
Alco-Sensor FST
EC/IR
EC/IR II
EC/IR II (Enhanced with serial number 10,000 or higher)
Portable EC/IR II
RBT-AZ
RBT-III
RBTIII-A
RBTIV
RBT IV with CEM (cell enhancement module)
Komyo Kitagawa, Kogyo, K.K., Japan:
Alcolyzer DPA-2[FN*]
Breath Alcohol Meter PAM ioiB[FN*]
Lifeloc Technologies, Inc., (formerly Lifeloc, Inc.), Wheat Ridge, Colorado:
PBA 3000B
PBA 3000-P[FN*]
PBA 3000C
Alcohol Data Sensor
Phoenix
Phoenix 6.0
EV30
FC10
FC20
Lion Laboratories, Ltd., Cardiff, Wales, United Kingdom:
Alcolmeter Model:
300
400
400+ (aka: Intoxilyzer 240 in the U.S.)
SD-2[FN*]
SD-5 (aka: S-D5 in the U.S.)
EBA[FN*]

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
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X

Intoxilyzer Model:
200
X
X
200D
X
X
1400
X
X
5000 CD/FG5
X
X
5000 EN
X
X
Luckey Laboratories, San Bernardino, California:
Alco-Analyzer Model:
iooo[FN*]
X
2000[FN*]
X
National Patent Analytical Systems, Inc., Mansfield, Ohio:
BAC DataMaster (with or without the Delta-i accessory)
BAC Verifier DataMaster (w/ or without the Delta--1 accessory)
X
X
DataMaster cdm (w/ or without the Delta-i accessory)
X
X
DataMaster DMT
X
X
Omicron Systems, Palo Alto, California:
Intoxilyzer Model:
40ii[FN*]
X
X
40iiAW[FN*]
X
X
Plus 4 Engineering, Minturn, Colorado:
5000 Plus 4[FN*]
X
X
Seres, Paris, France:
Alco Master
X
X
Alcopro
X
X
Siemans-Allis, Cheriy Hill, New Jersey:
Alcomat[FN*]
X
X
Alcomat F[FN*]
X
X
Smith and Wesson Electronics, Springfield, Massachusetts:
Breathalyzer Model:
900[FN*]
X
X
900A[FN*]
X
X
iooo[FN*]
X
X
200o[FN*]
X
X
2000 (non-Humidity Sensor)[FN*]
X
X
Sound-Off, Inc., Hudsonville, Michigan:
Alco Data
X
X
Seres Alco Master
X
X
Seres Alcopro
X
X
Stephenson Corp:
Breathalyzer 900 [FN*]
X
X
Tokai-Denshi Inc., Tokyo, Japan:
ALC-PRO II (US)
X
X
U.S. Alcohol Testing, Inc./Protection Devices, Inc.,, Rancho Cucamonga, California:
Alco-Analyzer 1000
X
Alco-Analyzer 2000
X
Alco-Analyzer 2100
X
X
Verax Systems, Inc., Fairport, New York:
BAC Verifier[FN*]
X
X
BAC Verifier Datamaster
X
X
BAC Verifier Datamaster H[FN*]
X
X
FN*Instruments marked with an asterisk (*) meet the Model Specifications detailed in 49 FR 48854 (December 14,
1984) (i.e., instruments tested at 0.000, 0.050, 0.101, and 0.151 BAC.) Instruments not marked with an asterisk meet
the Model Specifications detailed in 58 FR 48705 (September 17,1993), and were tested at BACs = 0.000, 0.020, 0.040,
0.080, and 0.160. All instruments that meet the Model Specifications currently in effect (dated September 17,1993) also
meet the Model Specifications for Screening Devices to Measure Alcohol in Bodily Fluids.
(Authority: 23USC403: 49 CFR150; 49 CFR Part 501).
Marilena Amoni,
Associate Administrator for the Office of Research and Program Development.
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